The version of Apache Airflow is prior to 1.10.11. It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities, including the following:

– An issue was found in Apache Airflow versions 1.10.10 and below. When using CeleryExecutor, if an attacker can connect to the broker (Redis, RabbitMQ) directly, it is possible to inject commands, resulting in the celery worker running arbitrary commands. (CVE-2020-11981)

– An issue was found in Apache Airflow versions 1.10.10 and below. When using CeleryExecutor, if an attack can connect to the broker (Redis, RabbitMQ) directly, it was possible to insert a malicious payload directly to the broker which could lead to a deserialization attack (and thus remote code execution) on the Worker. (CVE-2020-11982)

– An issue was found in Apache Airflow versions 1.10.10 and below. A remote code/command injection vulnerability was discovered in one of the example DAGs shipped with Airflow which would allow any authenticated user to run arbitrary commands as the user running airflow worker/scheduler (depending on the executor in use). If you already have examples disabled by setting load_examples=False in the config then you are not vulnerable. (CVE-2020-11978)

– The previous default setting for Airflow’s Experimental API was to allow all API requests without authentication, but this poses security risks to users who miss this fact. From Airflow 1.10.11 the default has been changed to deny all requests by default and is documented at https://airflow.apache.org/docs/1.10.11/security.html#api-authentication. Note this change fixes it for new installs but existing users need to change their config to default [api]auth_backend = airflow.api.auth.backend.deny_all as mentioned in the Updating Guide:
https://github.com/apache/airflow/blob/1.10.11/UPDATING.md#experimental-api-will-deny-all-request-by-default (CVE-2020-13927)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application’s self-reported version number.Read More