When storing and re-accessing data on a networking channel, the length of buffers may have been confused, resulting in an out-of-bounds memory read. Through a series of API calls and redirects, an attacker-controlled alert dialog could have been displayed on another website (with the victim website's URL shown). The fetch() API and navigation incorrectly shared the same cache, as the cache key did not include the optional headers fetch() may contain. Under the correct circumstances, an attacker may have been able to poison the local browser cache by priming it with a fetch() response controlled by the additional headers. Upon navigation to the same URL, the user would see the cached response instead of the expected response. A website could have obscured the fullscreen notification by using a dropdown select input element. This could have led to user confusion and possible spoofing attacks. If a website set a large custom cursor, portions of the cursor could have overlapped with the permission dialog, potentially resulting in user confusion and unexpected granted permissions. A malicious website could have used a combination of exiting fullscreen mode and requestPointerLock to cause the user's mouse to be re-positioned unexpectedly, which could have led to user confusion and inadvertently granting permissions they did not intend to grant. Set-Cookie response headers were being incorrectly honored in multipart HTTP responses. If an attacker could control the Content-Type…Read More
Security Vulnerabilities fixed in Firefox 123 — Mozilla
